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1. Introduction 
Recent research has shown that experimental data on risk and time preferences serve as a good 
predictor for field behavior, such as occupational choices (Bonin et al., 2007; Burks et al., 2009), 
credit card borrowing (Maier and Sprenger, 2010), smoking and alcohol consumption (Chabris et 
al., 2008), or nutrition (Chabris et al., 2008; Weller et al., 2008). For example, Chabris et al. 
(2008) find that experimentally elicited discount rates can explain inter-individual variation in 
the BMI (body mass index) or the intensity of physical exercise and smoking in a sample of 555 
adults. Burks et al. (2009) present data from 1,000 trainee truck drivers and show how 
experimentally elicited risk and time preferences – both are correlated with cognitive skills (see 
Dohmen et al., 2010) – are related to job attachment and duration of staying in a job. 
So far, research that relates experimental choices to field behavior has only studied choices 
of adults. In this paper, we elicit time preferences, risk and ambiguity attitudes of 661 children 
and adolescents, aged ten to eighteen years. We then relate their experimental choices to 
behavior in the field, in particular smoking, drinking, the body mass index (BMI), and savings. 
We find that experimental measures of impatience are significant predictors of field behavior 
already at an early stage in life. In particular, more impatient children and adolescents are more 
likely to spend money on alcohol and cigarettes, have a higher body mass index (BMI) and are 
less likely to save money. Taken together, more impatient children and adolescents have a 
considerably worse health outlook. However, the experimental measures for risk and ambiguity 
attitudes are at best weak predictors of field behavior. Only for the BMI we find that our 
experimental measure of risk aversion is significantly negatively related to the BMI. Hence, 
more risk averse subjects have a lower BMI. 
Studying children’s and adolescents’ preferences towards delay and uncertainty and the 
external validity of experimental results is relevant because it provides an important contribution 
to the optimal design of policy interventions that target children’s and adolescents’ behavior. In 
their transition from childhood to adulthood, they experience an increasing number of decisions 
involving uncertainty and long-term consequences. In many circumstances these decisions do 
not involve risk – where probabilities are known – but rather ambiguity, where probabilities are 
unknown or vague (Ellsberg, 1961; Halevy, 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Important examples 
include the uncertainties involved in drug intake, the practicing of unprotected sex, or  the 
investment for the future through saving or education. Therefore, we investigate not only risk but 
also ambiguity attitudes, alongside time preferences. 
So far, the evidence on children’s risk taking, ambiguity attitudes and impatience is still 
scarce. The existing literature suggests that children are relatively more risk seeking and delay 
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averse, i.e., impatient, compared to adults (see, for example, Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund, 
2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Levin et al., 2007). Although many 
decisions of children and adolescents involve both uncertainty and delay, to the best of our 
knowledge no empirical study has integrated both aspects in a single, unifying research design. 
Furthermore, none of the previously mentioned studies has examined the predictive power of 
experimentally elicited attitudes towards uncertainty or delay for field behavior. 
The first contribution of this paper is to provide a unified experimental framework to 
measure delay and uncertainty attitudes for a large sample of children and adolescents. If risk 
and time-preferences are correlated, as often conjectured, omitting one of the preference factors 
might lead to a wrong attribution of behavioral effects to the included one (Halevy 2008). 
The second contribution of this paper is to link experimentally elicited attitudes of children 
and adolescents to their field behavior, in particular to health related behavior and saving 
decisions. In other words, we assess the external validity of experimental measures for children 
and adolescents. A recent study by Castillo et al. (2010) is related to our approach. They study 
the link between experimentally elicited time preferences of 13- to 15-year old children to their 
disciplinary referrals in school, finding that less patient children have a less favorable outlook for 
school performance. Castillo et al. (2010) do not consider the influence of both time preferences 
and attitudes towards uncertainty, however, and they focus on different field behavior than we 
do. Due to the presumed interaction of time preferences and uncertainty attitudes in many of the 
significant decisions that children and adolescents face, measuring both attitudes and studying 
their joint effects on field behavior seems important. Compared to Castillo et al. (2010), we 
consider a larger age spectrum and a broader array of indicators that target health-related 
behavior and saving decisions. Putting particular emphasis on health issues (smoking, drinking, 
and the BMI) of children is relevant for the development of policy interventions that target 
behavior that has negative long-term consequences on their health and ultimately also on labor 
market success and economic prosperity (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002).  
In our experiment, we elicit risk, ambiguity and delay attitudes using simple versions of 
standard choice list tasks that are well-established and widely used in the economics literature. 
All decisions are incentivized, with cash as the reward medium, paid according to the choices 
made.1 In addition to eliciting economic preferences, we use a questionnaire to relate 
                                            
1 Note that Harbaugh et al. (2002), Bettinger and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2010) use vouchers or small gifts 
as rewards. However, gift certificates may carry more uncertainty than cash, thus causing an interaction of both time 
and risk preferences in the delay task (see Gneezy, List and Wu, 2006). For this reason, and given the permission of 
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demographic variables and information about subjects’ field behavior to attitudes on delay and 
uncertainty. Our experiment has another noteworthy feature: In contrast to all other studies, our 
experiment was conducted during regular school hours. That is, we had virtually no drop-outs 
and, thus, no self-selection into the experiment. Recent papers by Zauberman and Lynch (2005) 
and Noor (2009) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that self-selected 
participants in experiments may be those most in need of immediate cash, thus potentially 
biasing experimental findings in favor of present-biased decisions. Avoiding any self-selection 
minimizes the possibility of such biases. 
In our experiment we find, in the aggregate, patterns of preferences regarding risk, 
ambiguity, and impatience, that are typically also observed with adult experimental participants 
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2011). On average, our 
participants are risk averse, ambiguity averse and impatient. Interestingly, we find hardly any 
age effect within each dimension (of risk, ambiguity and patience), indicating that these 
preferences are pretty stable in the age group of 10- to 18-year olds. As is standard in the 
literature on adults’ risk aversion, we also find a strong gender difference such that girls are more 
risk averse than boys (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). High ability students measured by their math 
grades are more patient. Importantly, there is a significant relation between risk aversion and 
time preferences, with more risk averse subjects being more patient. Looking at the predictive 
power of experimental decisions for behavior in the field, we observe that for children and 
adolescents time preferences are a strong predictor of health-related field behavior and saving 
decisions, as already indicated above. However, the link between laboratory behavior and field 
behavioral measures is only weak for risk and ambiguity attitudes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data set and the 
general features of the experimental study. Sections 3 and 4 present the specific designs and 
results of the uncertainty and delay attitude elicitation, and the effects of individual background 
variables on these measures. In these sections we also discuss where our results replicate 
findings in the literature or deviate from them. Following previous papers (Keren and 
Roelofsma, 1995; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Halevy, 2008), we assume that delay often 
implies uncertainty, and we use uncertainty attitudes elicited in section 3 as explanatory 
                                                                                                                                             
all involved parties, including parents and school principals, we have decided to use cash in our experiment. 
Actually, in an earlier experiment with a different group of children in schools (on the trust game, see Sutter and 
Kocher, 2007) parents expressed an explicit preference for using money (as a generalized medium of exchange) 
over any other exchange medium. 
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variables in the analysis of time preferences in section 4. In section 5, we study how our 
experimental measures relate to field behavior with respect to smoking, drinking, the BMI and 
saving decisions. Section 6 discusses our main findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Subject pool and general experimental setup 
2.1. Subject pool 
We conducted experiments with a total of 661 children and adolescents, aged ten to eighteen 
years. The experiments were run in three Austrian schools, comparable to US high schools, in 
Innsbruck and Schwaz, two cities in the Federal State of Tyrol, between October 2007 and May 
2008. We randomly selected different classes in 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th grade. The youngest 
participants were 10 years old, the oldest ones 18 years. The distribution of students across 
grades and gender is shown in Table 1. The study was approved by the central school 
administration board of Tyrol, and the principals of the participating schools gave permission to 
conduct the experiments in class during regular school hours. Parents were informed about the 
experiment and the collection of demographic background data. All children got their parent’s 
permission to participate. Besides asking parents for consent, we also asked all students for their 
willingness to participate in the experiments. No single student dissented. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
2.2. General experimental setup 
The experiments involved real monetary payoffs and each subject got paid according to his 
or her choices. Payoffs used were between €4 and €14 (see sections 3 and 4 as well as the 
experimental procedure documented in Appendix A1). All students faced exactly the same 
decision tasks, instructions and payoffs (except for a minor variation in reward levels to test for 
payoff effects, see section 3). Students were aware that they could earn money in the 
experiments and that their payoffs would depend on their choices. Payoffs were determined and 
paid in cash immediately, except for future payoffs in the time preference experiment, which 
were paid (again in school) on a predetermined date in the future (see section 4). 
All experimental sessions were run jointly by the first author (male) and the third author 
(female) of this study in the students’ classrooms during regular school hours. At the end of 
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experimental sessions demographic background variables and additional survey data were 
collected through self-reports (see Appendix A2 for the questionnaire). 
We elicited risk and ambiguity attitudes and time preferences through choice lists. Each 
subject faced a number of ordered choices where a gamble (or an immediate payoff) was 
compared to an increasingly attractive sure (or future) payoff. Choice lists have been widely used 
in the economics literature (see, for example, Holt and Laury, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2010). They 
allow conditioning real payoffs on actual choices in an incentive compatible way. The structure 
of such lists typically provides subjects with relatively easy choices at the top and bottom (where 
the tradeoff between a sure amount and a gamble, respectively a smaller early payment and a 
larger delayed payment, is usually easy to resolve) and therefore helps subjects to focus on the 
difficult choices (typically in the middle) where the preference between the sure payoff and the 
gamble, respectively the early and delayed payment, becomes weak. 
Despite their simplicity, choice list elicitations sometimes yield inconsistent choices when 
subjects switch repeatedly between early and delayed payments (or the sure payoffs and the 
gamble) and sometimes choose the gamble over a sure payoff that is identical to the gamble’s 
large prize (Holt and Laury, 2002; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007). Although some authors have 
tried to recover consistent preferences from inconsistent choice lists (e.g., Bettinger and Slonim, 
2007; Lammers and van Wijnbergen, 2008), we believe that most of the inconsistencies we 
observe are actually due to mistakes or misunderstandings and that no consistent preferences can 
be recovered from the lists involving inconsistent choices. We have therefore eliminated all 
subjects with inconsistent choices (either in the uncertainty or the time preference experiment; 
see right-hand side of Table 1) from the analysis. This leaves us with 638 (out of 661) subjects 
with complete and consistent data. The pretty high level of consistent choices is probably a 
consequence of putting a lot of effort in explaining the choice lists to our participants, going 
through many examples and answering any remaining questions after carefully explaining the 
experiment. It is also important to note that our choice lists for eliciting uncertainty attitudes 
were significantly easier than the choice lists based on Holt and Laury (2002), which are often 
used in the literature. In contrast to Holt and Laury (2002), our subjects did not compare two 
different gambles with changing probability distributions along the list. Rather, they had to 
compare one (fixed) gamble to a sure amount that increased monotonically. Violations of 
monotonicity through multiple switching as, e.g., in the preference €4 ≻ gamble ≻ €5 became 
therefore obvious and were much easier to avoid. 
In principle, utility models for risk and ambiguity can be calibrated from the observed 
switching points (as in Holt and Laury, 2002, for instance). Similarly, discounting models for 
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time preferences can be estimated from the choice lists for delay (Bleichrodt, Rohde and 
Wakker, 2009; Attema et al., 2010). However, we decided to study preferences and their effects 
on field behavior in terms of the raw switching points to avoid any confounding effects due to 
(arbitrary) parametric assumptions. That is, we will define certainty equivalents for uncertainty 
tasks and future equivalents for delay tasks and relate them to demographics and field behavior 
directly, i.e., model-free. 
 
3. Risk and ambiguity attitudes 
3.1. Method 
We elicited risk and ambiguity attitudes within the framework of the Ellsberg two-color choice 
task (Ellsberg, 1961). Subjects were presented with two bags with twenty balls each. The balls 
were either white or orange. Subjects could win a fixed amount of money (see below) by betting 
on the color of their choice to be blindly drawn from a bag by themselves. One of the bags, the 
risky prospect, contained exactly ten white and ten orange balls, the distribution being known 
(and shown) to the subjects. The other bag, the ambiguous prospect, contained twenty balls that 
were either white or orange. The exact numbers of either color were unknown to the subjects. 
Note that no reference was given to probabilities for either bag. Rather, both prospects were 
described and actually played in terms of balls drawn from bags. 
For each prospect we presented subjects with a series of choices between playing the 
aforementioned bet or taking a sure payoff instead. The choices for each prospect were arranged 
in a list that offered the choice between increasing sure amounts and the gamble. An excerpt 
from the list that has been used in the experiment is shown in Figure 1 (see also Appendix A1). 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here 
 
Subjects made twenty ordered choices for the risky prospect and twenty choices for the 
ambiguous prospect, with changing orders between subjects. All choices were numbered, and 
one of the choices was randomly determined by lot to be played for real payoffs. Depending on 
the subject’s decision in the selected choice problem she would either play the gamble by betting 
on a color and drawing one ball from the bag or receive the sure payoff instead. 
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From the two choice lists we calculated the subject’s certainty equivalents for the prospects 
as the midpoint between the two sure payoffs where the subject switched from the gamble to the 
sure payoff. In the example in Figure 2, the certainty equivalent is calculated as €3.75.2 
 
3.2. Payoffs 
If subjects choose to play the gamble, they choose a color first and then blindly draw a ball from 
the bag. If the color drawn matches the color chosen before, they receive a prize. Otherwise they 
receive nothing. The prize was fixed at €10 for 472 out of 638 subjects, irrespective of their age. 
Keeping the prize constant allows us to have exactly the same design for all age groups. Of 
course, the €10 prize might be perceived differently by the younger cohorts than by the older 
cohorts in our experiment, perhaps confounding age and stake size effects. To control for stake 
size effects we introduced a prize variation in part of the sample (for 166 out of the 638 subjects 
with consistent choices), increasing the prize from €6 for 5th graders in steps of €2 up to €12 for 
11th graders. In addition to the payoffs from the experiment each participant received a show-up 
fee of €2. 
Denote the prize in the gamble with π. The sure payoffs in the choice lists always varied 
from π/20 to π in twenty evenly spaced steps. For instance, in the €10-prize group the smallest 
sure amount was €0.50, and each step added €0.50 to the sure amount. As a consequence, we 
kept the number of items in the choice list constant across payoff variation groups, eliminating 
possibly confounding list structure effects. 
 
3.3. Attitude measures 
We define measures of risk and ambiguity attitudes based on certainty equivalents (Wakker 
2010, chapter 11). As a measure of individual risk attitude r we use 
π/1 RCEr −=  (1) 
where CER denotes the certainty equivalent of the risky prospect, and individual subscripts 
are omitted. Values of r smaller (larger) than 0.5 indicate risk loving (risk aversion), with risk 
neutrality for r = 0.5. As a measure of ambiguity attitude we employ the value a, 
                                            
2 Subjects who always chose the gamble were excluded from the analysis. Subjects who always chose the sure 
amount were classified as having a certainty equivalent that is halfway in between zero and the sure amount in the 
first row. 
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)/()( ARAR CECECECEa +−=  (2) 
with CEA being the certainty equivalent of the ambiguous prospect. This measure ranges 
from –1 (extreme ambiguity loving) over 0 (ambiguity neutrality) to 1 (extreme ambiguity 
aversion). The larger the difference between the two certainty equivalents, the stronger is the 
ambiguity attitude, controlling for the absolute level of risk and ambiguity attitude. The 
normalization controls for the fact that, for example, a €2-difference weighs more heavily for a 
subject who is relatively risk averse (e.g., with a certainty equivalent of €3 for the risky prospect) 
than for a subject who is relatively risk neutral (e.g., with a certainty equivalent of €5 for the 
risky prospect). 
 
3.4. Results 
Risk aversion. In the aggregate, we find significant risk aversion in our sample, with a mean 
(median) measure of risk aversion of r = 0.57 (0.53) (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test3, 
testing whether r is different from 0.5). A regression, including demographic background 
variables, is shown in Table 2. It reveals first and foremost a clear gender effect: girls are 
significantly more risk averse than boys.4 Age does not have a significant effect. All other 
independent variables are not significant, either.5 Among them are the grades for math and 
German. These grades were obtained from the teachers. They are coded as relative grades in 
comparison to a class’s average grade. Positive variables indicate that a subject has a better grade 
than the class average, negative grades the reverse. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Ambiguity aversion. A clear majority of our sample is ambiguity averse. The mean 
(median) ambiguity aversion for the whole sample yields a = 0.13 (0.07) (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test, testing whether a is different from 0). The regression in Table 2 shows that 
there are neither gender nor age effects for ambiguity preferences. The number of siblings 
increases the level of ambiguity aversion weakly significantly. Higher prizes make subjects 
                                            
3 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. 
4 A separate regression (not shown here) confirms that there is no interaction between gender and age. Hence, the 
gender effect on risk aversion is independent of age. 
5 We also have background data on religious or immigration background. None of these variables is significant if 
included in the regression. The inclusion of the variables does not change any of our results, either. 
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weakly significantly less ambiguity averse, meaning that with higher stakes certainty equivalents 
become more similar for the risky and ambiguous prospects. Subjects with better German grades 
are more ambiguity averse. Other background variables are not significant. 
 
3.5. Discussion 
Overall, we find a considerable degree of risk and ambiguity aversion for our sample of children 
and adolescents. Interestingly, there are no age effects on risk and ambiguity aversion, contrary 
to an earlier study by Harbaugh et al. (2002), for instance. The practical absence of self-selection 
of participants into our experiments might be responsible for the different results. The strong 
gender effect for risk aversion found here is a standard result for adults, however (Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009). It shows that in our large sample of children and adolescents, girls are more risk 
averse than boys. 
In our study, ambiguity aversion does not change with age, but it is prevalent in all age 
groups, and ambiguity attitudes seem to be influenced by different factors than risk attitudes, 
since there is no overlap between the factors affecting risk and ambiguity preferences. Most 
strikingly, while gender has a strong influence on risk attitudes, no effect is found for ambiguity 
attitudes. These results are in line with findings in Borghans et al. (2009) for a sample of fifteen 
and sixteen year old high school students. Ambiguity is influenced by social factors, though, like 
the number of siblings. This result is consistent with social explanations of ambiguity attitudes 
proposed by Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986), Morris (1997), or Trautmann, Vieider and 
Wakker (2008), for instance. 
 
4. Attitudes toward delayed payoffs – Measuring impatience 
4.1. Method, payoffs, and attitude measures 
Attitudes toward delay – or a subject’s impatience – were elicited by letting subjects choose 
between sure payoffs at two different points in time. We used choice lists where the early payoff 
remained fixed, and the later payoff was increased monotonically along the list, starting with the 
payoff at the earlier time point (see Figure 3 for an example and appendix A1). 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here 
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From the lists we calculated the future equivalent of the fixed payoff at the earlier point in 
time as the midpoint between the two later payoffs where a subject switches from the earlier to 
the later payment. In Figure 4, for example, the future equivalent equals €11.40. A larger future 
equivalent indicates stronger delay aversion, i.e., impatience. 
We presented to each subject eight different choice lists. The lists differed by the stake size 
of the early payoff (either €4.05 or €10.10) and by the timing of the early and/or late payoffs. 
The amounts in the lists increased in steps of €0.10 (€0.20) from €4.05 (€10.10) to €5.95 
(€13.90). For each stake size we elicited preferences for four different timing combinations of 
payoffs, summarized in Figure 5. In the first list subjects made choices between receiving a 
payoff today (upfront-delay of zero) versus receiving a payoff in three weeks (delay of three 
weeks). The second list maintained the three weeks delay, but shifted it into the future by having 
the early payment only in three weeks (i.e., the upfront-delay was three weeks). List 3 required 
choices between a payoff today and a payoff in one year, and list 4 shifted the latter list into the 
future by having an upfront-delay of three weeks again. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Note that choice lists 1 and 2 measure the attitude toward an identical delay (of three 
weeks) with and without an upfront-delay, similarly for choice lists 3 and 4 where the delay is 
one year. Comparison of future equivalents between these lists allows us to test for constant 
versus hyperbolic discounting/present bias (Laibson, 1997; Prelec, 2004; Bleichrodt et al., 2009). 
If future equivalents are higher for list 1 than for list 2 and for list 3 than for list 4, the immediate 
payment receives more weight than the early payment in three weeks time, indicating hyperbolic 
discounting. Recall that these four timing combinations were used both for high and low stakes 
to control for stake size effects. 
Subjects filled out the eight choice lists in a random order. One list and one item on the list 
were randomly selected after all choices had been made. Payoffs were paid out at the date chosen 
by the subject in the selected choice problem. 
 
4.2. Payment procedures for delayed payoffs 
A potential problem in time preference experiments with real payoffs concerns the equivalence 
between different time points in terms of transaction costs and uncertainty about delivery of the 
payment. Some researchers have therefore argued for the use of hypothetical payoffs in such 
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tasks (Read, 2005). Other approaches have used dated checks or vouchers (e.g., Anderhub et al., 
2001; McClure et al., 2004) or delivered the money in person to each single participant on the 
relevant day for payment (Albrecht et al., 2011). In general, researchers acknowledge the 
empirical problems and try to minimize confounds through uncertainty and transaction costs, an 
approach also taken in the present paper. 
Transaction costs. The experiment was part of a larger series of experiments conducted at 
all participating schools, with researchers coming to the schools on a regular basis over a period 
of two years. The time frame involved in the delay task (with payments up to one year and three 
weeks in the future) was completely covered by the two-year period, implying practically no 
additional transaction costs of future payments. This is assuming that students stay at their 
school, of course. Mobility is very low in Austria – compared to the U.S., for instance – and is 
not a factor in children’s decisions. For those who did go to another school it was guaranteed 
through the principal’s office that they would receive their payment by mail. In fact, no students 
left school for the three-week and six-week periods. During the one year period, seven students 
(roughly 1%) left their school and received their payments by mail. 
Uncertainty of future payment. The time preference experiment was preceded at earlier 
dates by other experiments in which the students earned money exactly as described in the 
provided instructions, building up students’ trust in our experimental procedure and credibility.6 
Furthermore, parents, principals and teachers had consented to this long-term project, adding to 
the trustworthiness of the researchers and reducing the possible uncertainty surrounding future 
payments. 
 
4.3. Results 
In Table 3 we analyze the determinants of subjects’ impatience. We take a subject’s future 
equivalent in each of the eight choice lists as the dependent variable in the regression (that 
clusters on single subjects). As independent variables we use dummies to account for the 
presence of an upfront-delay (=1), of high stakes (=1), and of a one-year delay (=1). We also 
consider two-way interaction terms of these three dummies to account for interaction effects.7 
Gender is also interacted with these dummies because gender differences in impatience might be 
                                            
6 For instance, in Martinsson et al. (2011) we studied social preferences. 
7 Adding a three-way interaction term of the three dummies yields and insignificant coefficient and is not warranted 
due to model selection criteria based on AIC and BIC. 
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related to the details of intertemporal choice. Finally we add risk aversion and ambiguity 
aversion as explanatory variables, and include all background variables used before. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Looking at the three dummy variables we note that high stakes increase the future 
equivalent by about 6.8 Euros. This is significantly higher than 6.05 Euros, the difference 
between low and high stakes (p < 0.001; Wald-test). Experiencing a delay of one year instead of 
only three weeks adds another 0.44 Euros. The dummy for having an upfront-delay of three 
weeks (until the early payoff is received) is not significant. Only in the case where an upfront 
delay is combined with high stakes and a one-year waiting period we find significant hyperbolic 
discounting (“upfront-delay” + “upfront-delay*high stakes” + “upfront-delay*one-year delay” = 
0; p < 0.01; Wald-test). In this case the future equivalent is an estimated 0.04 Euros higher if 
there is no upfront-delay (reward is available today), compared to an upfront-delay of three 
weeks. 
Importantly, we find that more risk averse subjects are more patient, i.e., have a smaller 
future equivalent ceteris paribus. Ambiguity aversion has no effect, though, nor has age. 
Subjects with better math skills (i.e., a better math grade relative to the class average) are also 
more patient, indicating a relation between analytic skills and patience (or self-constraint). 
Gender does not have a significant main effect on a subject’s patience. However, the interaction 
term “female*high stakes” is significantly negative (p < 0.05; Wald-test), indicating that with 
high stakes girls are actually more patient than boys. We also observe two weakly significant 
effects. A higher number of siblings makes subjects more impatient, perhaps because they 
experience in their families that waiting can increase the risk of not getting a particular thing 
because it is already consumed or appropriated by a sibling. Students who receive more weekly 
pocket money are less patient in our task. This might seem surprising at first sight because one 
could presume that children receiving small amounts of pocket money are more liquidity 
constrained and therefore less patient. A conceivable explanation for our finding could be that 
children receiving more pocket money are less used to exert financial self-constraint and are 
therefore less able to do so in the experiment. 
 
Table 4 about here 
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The future equivalents observed in the eight choice lists can be used to calculate implicit 
annual discount rates.8 Table 4 presents the median annual discount rates. Not surprisingly, they 
are considerably larger for the short delay (of three weeks only) than the long delay (of one year) 
and also higher for low stakes than for high stakes. Interestingly, though, the median annual 
discount rates are practically identical for choice lists with or without an upfront delay of three 
weeks, indicating that hyperbolic discounting is at best of minor importance in this data-set. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
In contrast to other studies (see Frederick et al., 2002) we find no unambiguous evidence for 
hyperbolic or present biased discounting. Rather, hyperbolic discounting is only significant with 
the longest possible waiting time (of one year) and high stakes. As we have argued, uncertainty 
and transaction costs involved in the future payoffs were comparatively low in our study. Since 
other studies also controlled for these factors this is unlikely to fully account for the very weak 
evidence of a present bias. Perhaps more relevant as an explanation for our results is the fact that 
all students of the recruited classes did actually participate in the experiments. That is, in contrast 
to other studies, there was no self-selection of participants into the experiment. Recent papers by 
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) and Noor (2009) present theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence that self-selected participants in experiments may be those most in need for immediate 
cash, i.e., those with present-biased decisions. This might bias results of estimations in favor of 
finding present-biased discounting in other studies. The absence of self-selection in our 
experiment is therefore a promising candidate to explain our weak evidence for hyperbolic 
discounting. In general, we find annual discount rates and variation in these rates across time 
range and stake size similar to those reported in other studies (see Frederick et al., 2002). 
Interestingly, higher individual levels of risk aversion as measured in the first experiment 
predict more patience. This is in line with earlier findings (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995). There 
are no robust age effects and no effects of ambiguity attitude on patience, however. Concerning 
the relation of risk attitudes and patience, we note that impatience has been related to low self-
control and impulsivity (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989; Reynolds et al., 2006). Risk 
tolerance has similarly been related to impulsivity (Vuchinich and Calamas, 1997; Zaleskiewicz, 
2001; Levin and Hart, 2003; Borghans et al., 2009). While these studies have confirmed a 
                                            
8 Using continuous discounting we calculate the discount rates with i=ln(future equivalent/early payoff) in case of a 
one year delay and with i=ln(future equivalent/early payoff)*52/3 in case of a three weeks delay. 
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relationship between impatience and risk tolerance for adults, our results on time preferences 
extend these findings to decision making of children and adolescents. A lower risk tolerance is 
associated with less delay aversion, or put the other way, more risk averse students are more 
patient. 
High ability students (with respect to math grades) are also more patient. This effect is 
consistent with findings in Steinberg et al. (2009) and Castillo et al. (2010), and it suggests that 
intellectual capacity helps to overcome the temptations of immediate gratification. Finally, we 
have found women to be more patient under high-stakes conditions, but not under low-stakes 
conditions. Bettinger and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2010) have found women to be more 
patient in intertemporal choice. In contrast to these studies, our experiments adds variation in 
stake size and length of the delay. Our results thus indicate that these variables are important 
moderators of the gender effect. Because our high stake was similar to the stake size in the 
previous literature, the result suggests that boys become relatively more impatient than girls as 
stakes increase. 
 
5. Experimental measures and field behavior 
All previous studies relating field behavior to experimental measures of impatience or 
uncertainty attitudes consider only either time preferences or uncertainty attitudes as explanatory 
variables. In the present study we consider both dimensions, time and uncertainty and use 
experimental measures of risk, ambiguity, and delay attitudes to explain field behavior of 
children and adolescents. We put particular emphasis on the relation of experimental measures to 
health-related behavior, a question that has, so far, only been studied for adults (Chabris et al., 
2008; Weller et al., 2008). 
We have collected data on four particular dependent variables in a post-experimental 
questionnaire (see Appendix A2). The variable “body mass index” (BMI) is a continuous 
variable9, allowing us to use least squares regressions. The other three variables are constructed 
as binary variables, indicating the use of probit regressions. The variables “smoking” and 
“alcohol consumption” are coded as one if subjects indicated in the questionnaire to spend 
                                            
9 We computed a specific measure by dividing the child’s body mass index by the median body mass index for each 
age cohort, controlling for gender. The median body mass index for girls and boys in each age group was taken from 
a dataset of the World Health Organization in 2007 (at http://www.who.int/growthref/bmifa_girls_5_19years_z.pdf, 
and http://www.who.int/growthref/bmifa_boys_5_19years_z.pdf). 
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money for cigarettes and alcohol respectively. Likewise, “saving” is coded one if subjects 
indicated to save money. These binary variables provide sufficient variation for our subject pool, 
and the related questions in the survey are far less intrusive than questions about the exact 
amount of, for instance, alcohol consumption or cigarettes smoked per day or week. They are 
obviously less prone to measurement error. A look at the raw data shows that the binary 
questions elicited answers that truly reflect behavior. For instance, according to our data the 
proportion of students that spend pocket money on alcohol rises monotonically from 2.4% at an 
age of twelve years to 85.7% at an age of 18 years.10 
Table 5 presents the regression results in a condensed form (while the single regressions 
underlying Table 5 are presented separately in Table 6 for the reader’s convenience). We have 
run for each of the eight measures of impatience (i.e., for the future equivalent in each single 
choice list) one regression for each of our four dependent variables. This is a conservative 
approach that checks whether different choice lists for time preference tasks yield a different 
impact of future equivalents on the dependent variables. Only if the data on impatience from all 
eight choice lists lead basically to the same result, we can confidently conclude that impatience 
has a robust influence in a certain direction. 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 about here 
 
To simplify the presentation of results in Table 5 we only show the significant signs of the 
effects on behavior. In fact, the signs of significant coefficients are always identical for all eight 
regressions for each of the four dependent variables, providing a first indication that the eight 
different regressions produce a consistent pattern. In parentheses in Table 5, we report the 
number of times (x y z) an independent variable is significant at the 1 (= x), 5 (= y), and 10 (= z) 
percent level. For instance, “– (8 0 0)” means that an independent variable is significantly 
negative in all eight regressions on the 1 percent level. 
Our measure for impatience predicts most field behavior strongly and significantly. More 
impatient students are more likely to spend money for smoking and alcohol consumption and are 
less likely to save. For the body mass index our measure of impatience yields significant results 
only for two out of eight regressions, such that in these cases more impatient students have a 
higher BMI. The body mass index is strongly associated with risk aversion, however. More risk 
                                            
10 Note that the legal drinking age in Austria for beer and wine is 16 years and enforcement is much less strict than 
in the US, for instance. 
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averse students have a lower BMI. For the other three dependent variables risk aversion has no 
significant impact. Ambiguity is only significant for smoking habits. Those students who are 
more ambiguity averse smoke less. In general, we find that adding impatience, risk and 
ambiguity aversion as explanatory variables explains a significant amount of variation. The 
inclusion of these variables improves the explained variance by 0.04 for saving, 0.03 for 
smoking, and 0.01 for drinking as well as for the body mass index. 
All demographic background variables have the expected signs and therefore largely 
confirm expectations. For instance, smoking and drinking increase significantly with age, while 
saving goes down. Gender effects are rather small. We find that girls have a weakly significantly 
lower BMI across all regressions.11 Intellectual capacity as measured by math grades is 
important. Students with better math grades are more likely to save money and less likely to 
smoke. There seems to be also a tendency of smarter students drinking less alcohol. Having more 
pocket money has a clear association with alcohol consumption, though. Being less financially 
constrained (through higher amounts of pocket money) increases the likelihood of spending 
money for alcohol. 
The general picture emerging from Table 5 suggests that impatience is more important than 
uncertainty attitudes in shaping the field behavior that we were interested in here. Only for the 
BMI and smoking we find evidence that both delay and uncertainty aversion have a joint 
influence. This provides evidence for the presumption that especially delay aversion and, to a 
lesser extent, low levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are related to low levels of 
inhibition of impulse-driven behavior. 
Overall, our results on field behavior involving delay and uncertainty are broadly 
consistent with the findings for adults. In particular, our study of school children replicates the 
effects of impatience on health and financial behaviors shown for adults. The magnitudes of the 
effects are similar to those reported in Chabris et al. (2008), for instance. Chabris et al. (2008) 
also point out that the relatively small effects of delay aversion on single activities may 
accumulate to substantial effects in total. The same holds true for our study. We find that more 
impatient children are more likely to smoke, drink alcohol and have a higher body mass index, 
leading to an overall far less favorable health outlook compared to more patient children. 
 
                                            
11 62.9% of our female participants have a relative BMI of less than 1, while this is true for only 53.7% of our male 
participants. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed how experimentally elicited risk and ambiguity as well as time 
preferences of children and adolescents relate to field behavior concerning decisions with 
delayed and uncertain outcomes such as health-related behavior or savings. Our experiment has 
been run in three different schools by randomly selecting several classes from 5th, 7th, 9th, and 
11th grade, including in total 661 students, aged ten to eighteen years. A particularly noteworthy 
feature of our experiment is the absence of selection effects of students. Since the experiments 
were run during regular school hours there were no drop outs. Hence, our results cannot be 
biased from self-selection into experimental participation. 
In the experiment, we have found clear evidence for delay, risk and ambiguity aversion in 
the aggregate. Our findings for children and adolescents are largely in line with adult populations 
(Frederick et al., 2002; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Wakker, 2010). 
Considering the effects of demographics on attitudes, it seems interesting to note that for our 
sample of ten- to eighteen-year olds we have found no age effects in any dimension (risk, 
ambiguity, impatience). If age plays a role, this might be before the age of ten, as the results in 
Harbaugh et al. (2002) suggest. We have been able to replicate the standard finding that women 
are more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Similarly, women have been found to 
be more patient, like in Bettinger and Slonim (2007) or Castillo et al. (2010). However, the latter 
finding is restricted to the time preference tasks with high stakes only. For low stakes, there are 
no gender differences with respect to impatience in our data. Our variation of various dimensions 
in the elicitation of time preferences (with respect to upfront-delay, high stakes and delay period) 
has allowed us to investigate gender differences in patience in more detail. Concerning cognitive 
abilities, better math grades have been associated with more patience. 
Turning to the relation of risk and ambiguity attitudes with time preferences, we have 
found that more risk averse subjects are more patient. Ambiguity attitudes, however, have no 
effect on impatience. Interestingly, in our subject pool we have seen little evidence for present-
biased preferences, i.e., hyperbolic discounting. Since the existing evidence for present-biased 
preferences could be influenced by the self-selection of subjects into experiments (Zauberman 
and Lynch, 2005; Noor, 2009), our findings might be explained by the lack of self-selection into 
the experiment. 
The key finding of this paper, however, concerns the relationship of experimental measures 
and field behavior. Most importantly, we have found that students who are more impatient in the 
time preference experiment are less likely to save money, more likely to smoke, more likely to 
consume alcohol and have a higher body mass index. Taken together, these effects lead in 
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particular to an overall far less favorable health outlook for impatient students than for those 
students who are more patient, i.e., less delay averse. In contrast to our experimental measures of 
impatience, we have shown that the elicited risk and especially ambiguity attitudes are less 
frequently good predictors of field behavior. Only for the body mass index we have observed a 
significantly negative influence of risk aversion, indicating that more risk averse students have a 
lower BMI. A higher level of ambugity aversion seems to be weakly related to less smoking. The 
generally low predictive power of risk attitudes for field behavior has been found earlier for 
adults already (Dohmen et al., 2011). Our study corroborates this finding for a large sample of 
children and adolescents. We consider this an important result, since the existence of a relation 
between experimental measures and field behavior for children and adolescents concerns a 
period in life where policy interventions might most easily be implemented. 
Given our findings on the negative effects of impatience on saving decisions and health 
status already for children and adolescents, it seems an important avenue for future research to 
address possible behavioral or educational interventions that might moderate impatience in 
children and adolescents, since impatience in childhood and adolescence can have strongly 
negative long-term consequences, in particular for a person’s health condition. The literature on 
active decision making and optimal defaults to help overcome working professionals’ myopia in 
saving for retirement (see, e.g., Carroll et al., 2009) has not been extended to children’s and 
adolescents’ decisions, yet. However, it seems plausible that active decision making (for 
choosing healthier food or exercising more frequently, for instance) and defaults (regular weight 
controls in schools, for example) might contribute to overcome the negative effects of the 
existing preference for impatience in children and adolescents. 
Our study suggests that preferences concerning the timing and the uncertainty of payoffs 
seem to be formed early in childhood and stay constant later on, since we have found no age 
effects. Using experimental measurements as in the current study may help identifying those 
children that are, for instance, at risk of unhealthy behavior even before such behavior sets out. 
Interventions could then be better focused on those individuals instead of targeting the whole 
groups and could be applied, if necessary, relatively early in life to maximize the potential 
benefits. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of participants by age and gender 
Age Grade Total # girls # boys # inconsistent choice list 
(years)     Uncertainty Delay 
10-11 5th  208  118  90 5 (2%) 6 (3%) 
12-13 7th  184  94  90 4 (2%) 3 (2%) 
14-15 9th  135  76  59 3 (2%) 2 (1%) 
16-18 11th  134  71  63 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
SUM   661  359  302 12 (2%) 11 (2%) 
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Table 2: OLS-regression analysis for risk and ambiguity attitude 
                    Dependent 
                        variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
 
Risk aversion 
 
 
 
Ambiguity 
Aversion 
Female  0.069*** (0.019) 0.022 (0.019) 
Age (in years) -0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 
# of siblings −0.005 (0.009) 0.017* (0.009) 
Pocket money per week −0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.000) 
Size prize urns  −0.001 (0.009) -0.015* (0.009) 
German grade# 
Math grade# 
0.015 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
(0.010) 
0.024** 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
(0.011) 
No. of observations  638   638  
R squared 0.039  0.032  
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Positive coefficients imply increasing risk/ambiguity aversion. 
# Grades are relative to the average in class. Positive variables indicate better than average 
performance. 
Controls for counterbalancing the two choice lists included. 
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Table 3: OLS-regression analysis for impatience (future equivalents) 
                    Dependent  
                        variable 
Explanatory  
Variables 
 
Future equivalent 
 
Upfront-delay 0.030 (0.021) 
High stakes 6.785*** (0.046) 
One-year delay  0.443***     (0,035) 
Upfront-delay*high stakes -0.045** (0.021) 
Upfront-delay*one-year delay -0.049** (0.021) 
High-stakes*one-year delay 0.369*** (0.031) 
Female -0.047 (0.048) 
Female*upfront-delay 0.018 (0.026) 
Female*high stakes -0.149*** (0.057) 
Female*one-year delay 0.025 (0.050) 
Age (in years) 0.009 (0.017) 
Risk aversion -0.384** (0.154) 
Ambiguity aversion 0.062 (0.125) 
# of siblings 0.066* (0.037) 
Pocket money per week 0.005* (0.002) 
German-grade# 0.036 (0.042) 
Math-grade# -0.186*** (0.038) 
No. of observations            638  
R squared 0.924  
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Clustered for individual subjects. 
Positive coefficients imply higher future equivalents, i.e., more impatience. 
# Grades are relative to the average in class. Positive variables indicate better than average 
performance. 
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Table 4: Median annual discount rates (%) 
                     Delay 
Stake size 
3 weeks 3 weeks with 
upfront delay 
1 year 1 year with 
upfront delay 
Low  330 365 29 31 
High  179 179 21 19 
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Table 5: Determinants of field behavior (OLS- and Marginal-Probit-Regression) – Overview* 
 Saving Smoking Alcohol consumption Body mass index 
Impatience (future equivalent) – (8 0 0) + (2 4 1) + (4 3 0) + (0 2 0) 
Risk aversion    – (0 8 0) 
Ambiguity aversion  – (0 2 6)   
Age  – (8 0 0) + (8 0 0) + (8 0 0)  
Female  + (0 0 1)  – (0 0 8) 
German grade#     
Math grade# + (8 0 0) – (8 0 0) – (0 0 3)  
No. of siblings     
Pocket money per week   + (0 0 6)  
No. of observations 638 638 638 611 
Mean (pseudo) R² 0.190 0.358 0.397 0.031 
Note: 
* The table shows only significant effects (by sign) of independent variables on the four dependent variables. We have run eight regressions per dependent variable, using each of 
the eight choice lists in the intertemporal choice task once. The entries in the table read as follows: 
+: increases dependent variable, – : decreases dependent variable; (x y z) denotes the number of times the variable is significant at the 1% (= x), 5% (= y), 10% (= z) level. 
The full set of regressions behind this table is reproduced in Table 6, where Panel A concerns Saving, Panel B Smoking, Panel C Alcohol consumption, and Panel D the Body 
mass index. 
# Grades are relative to the average in class. Positive variables indicate better than average performance. 
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Table 6: Regressions behind Table 5 
 
 
 
Panel A: Determinants of field behavior: Saving (Marginal-Probit-Regression) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Saving 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Delay -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
aversion (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Risk aversion 0.016 0.018 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.016 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
Ambiguity 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.005 
aversion (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
German 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
grade (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Math grade 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of siblings -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pocket mo- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ney per week (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of 
observations 
638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
Pseudo R² 0.174 0.176 0.183 0.175 0.193 0.199 0.212 0.205 
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Model A: 3 weeks delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model B: 3 weeks delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model C: 3 weeks delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model D: 3 weeks delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
Model E: 1 year delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model F: 1 year delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model G: 1 year delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model H: 1 year delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
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Panel B: Determinants of field behavior: Smoking (Marginal-Probit-Regression) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Smoking 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Delay 0.009** 0.009*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.007* 0.005 0.003** 0.004** 
aversion (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Risk aversion -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Ambiguity -0.015* -0.011* -0.016* -0.015** -0.017* -0.019* -0.016* -0.017** 
aversion (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
German grade -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Math grade -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 0.004 
No. of siblings -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pocket money -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
per week (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of. 
observations 
638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
Pseudo R² 0.363 0.390 0.357 0.367 0.348 0.341 0.349 0.352 
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Model A: 3 weeks delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model B: 3 weeks delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model C: 3 weeks delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model D: 3 weeks delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
Model E: 1 year delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model F: 1 year delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model G: 1 year delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model H: 1 year delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
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Panel C: Determinants of field behavior: Alcohol consumption (Marginal-Probit-Regression) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Alcohol consumption 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Delay 0.044*** 0.039** 0.021*** 0.020** 0.031** 0.016 0.021*** 0.025*** 
aversion (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
Risk aversion 0.021 0.022 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.025 0.026 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Ambiguity -0.056 -0.051 -0.057 -0.056 -0.052 -0.055 -0.052 -0.058 
aversion (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) 
Age 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Female 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
German grade 0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Math grade -0.014 -0.016* -0.013 -0.015 -0.017* -0.018* -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of. siblings -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Pocket money 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 
per week (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of 
observations 
638 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
Pseudo R² 0.399 0.395 0.396 0.395 0.392 0.387 0.400 0.408 
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Model A: 3 weeks delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model B: 3 weeks delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model C: 3 weeks delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model D: 3 weeks delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
Model E: 1 year delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model F: 1 year delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model G: 1 year delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model H: 1 year delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
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Panel D: Determinants of field behavior: Body mass index (OLS-Regression) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable: Body mass index 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Delay aversion 0.024** 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.006 0.008** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Risk aversion -0.052** -0.057** -0.052** -0.054** -0.056** -0.056** -0.056** -0.055** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ambiguity -0.021 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
aversion (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.019* -0.020* -0.019* -0.019* -0.020* -0.020* -0.020* -0.019* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
German grade -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Math grade 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of siblings -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pocket money 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
per week (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of 
observations 
611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 
R² 0.036 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.033 
Notes. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Model A: 3 weeks delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model B: 3 weeks delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model C: 3 weeks delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model D: 3 weeks delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
Model E: 1 year delay, low stake, no upfront delay. 
Model F: 1 year delay, low stake, upfront delay. 
Model G: 1 year delay, high stake, no upfront delay. 
Model H: 1 year delay, high stake, upfront delay. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Choice list for uncertainty task 
[1] draw from bag A  O or  O €0.50 for sure 
[2] draw from bag A  O or O €1.00 for sure 
[3] draw from bag A  O or O €1.50 for sure 
.... etc. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Choice list for uncertainty task  
[6] draw from bag A  ⊗ or  O €3.00 for sure 
[7] draw from bag A  ⊗ or O €3.50 for sure 
[8] draw from bag A  O or ⊗ €4.00 for sure 
...etc. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Choice list for time preference task 
[1] receive €10.10 now O or  O receive €10.10 in three weeks 
[2] receive €10.10 now O or  O receive €10.30 in three weeks  
[3] receive €10.10 now O or  O receive €10.50 in three weeks 
....etc. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Choice list for time preference task 
[6] receive €10.10 now ⊗ or  O receive €11.10 in three weeks  
[7] receive €10.10 now ⊗ or  O receive €11.30 in three weeks  
[8] receive €10.10 now O or  ⊗ receive €11.50 in three weeks  
...etc. 
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Figure 5: Combinations of early and late payoff (four choice lists for sure payoff €10.10) 
 
 
 
 
  
3 weeks
€10.10 
today 
€10.10 + x  
3 weeks 
6 weeks
€10.10 + x 
3 weeks 
€10.10 
€10.10 
today 
€10.10 + x
1 year 
1 year and 3 weeks 
€10.10 + x 
3) 
4)
1) 
2) 
€10.10 
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Appendix (not intended for publication) 
 
A1. Experimental instructions [translated from German] 
 
Procedures: 
The experiments concerning risk and ambiguity preferences were run between November 2007 
and January 2008, while the experiments concerning time preferences were conducted between 
April and May 2008. Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes, including the completion of 
a post-experimental questionnaire and the distribution of the earned money. In the risk and 
ambiguity preference experiment all subjects privately received their money at the very end of 
the session. Therefore, subjects were called one by one to a separate room where they first had 
to draw a card to determine the decision problem which was relevant for payment. In a second 
step the urn was played if the subject preferred the lottery over the sure amount in the respective 
decision. In the time preference experiment, subjects received an immediate payoff if they had 
chosen it over a delayed payoff at the end of the experiment as cash. In case a payoff in the 
future was chosen (or the selected choice had an upfront-delay of three weeks) the money was 
distributed in sealed envelopes at the predefined date. 
Note that all sessions within a particular school were run at the same day. 
In order to guarantee anonymity, we used partition walls and forbade any kind of conversation 
among students. Instructions were memorized by the experimenter and orally presented in class 
at the beginning of each session. Periodically the instructor paused and let the subjects raise 
their hands for questions which were then answered privately. An English translation of orally 
presented instructions and of the decision sheets is presented below. 
 
 
Risk and ambiguity experiment (here we present the order where the task to elicit risk 
attitudes has been explained before the task to elicit ambiguity attitudes) 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game. From now on, 
please don’t talk to your neighbor and listen carefully. You can earn money in this game. We 
will give you the money in cash at the end of this lesson. How much money you will earn 
depends mainly on your decisions. That’s why it is important that you understand the rules of our 
game. Please listen carefully now. We will frequently stop during our explanation and allow you 
to ask questions. Therefore, please raise your hand and one of us will come to you to answer 
your question. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Our game consists of two parts. In total, you will have to make 40 decisions, 20 in part one and 
20 in part two. One of these decisions will be paid for real, and we will explain in the end how 
we determine the decision to be paid. First we will explain the first part. You have to choose 20 
times between a safe amount of money and drawing a ball from bag (A). By drawing from the 
bag you may win 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment). Only one of 
your decisions will be relevant. We will explain that carefully at the end of this instruction. 
Next we explain to you how drawing a ball from bag (A) works: We fill this bag with ten orange 
and ten white balls. (fill bag and show balls to children and count orange and white balls) When 
you decide to draw a ball from bag (A), you draw a ball blindly. Before you draw the ball you 
have to choose a color (let’s say white). If the drawn ball is really white, you receive 10 € 
  35
(respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment). If the drawn ball is orange, you get 
nothing. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
You will receive a decision sheet which looks exactly like the slide on the overhead projector. 
(Switch on overhead projector and point to the slide) We will then, when we play the game, ask 
you to make a decision for each row between drawing a ball from bag (A) (point to the left) and 
a sure amount of money (point to the right). This looks for example like this: In the first row you 
decide whether you prefer drawing a ball from bag (A) and thereby maybe winning 10 € 
(respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment), or if you prefer taking 50 cents 
(respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) home for sure. Assuming 
that you prefer drawing a ball from bag (A) instead of getting 50 cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 
cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) for sure, which box do you have to check in this 
case? (Assume answer is “left”.) Right, you check the box at the left side. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
In the second row you decide again between drawing a ball from bag (A) and a sure amount of 
money. Now you are offered 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the 
treatment) to take home for sure. As you can see the sure amount on the right hand side increases 
successively. As long as you prefer drawing a ball from bag (A) to taking a sure amount of 
money home, you check the box at the left hand side. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Assume that you like drawing a ball from bag (A) very much, then you might check the boxes on 
the left hand side until the last but one row. In the very last row you then have to choose between 
getting 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment) for sure if you check the 
box on the right side or maybe winning 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the 
treatment) by checking the box on the left side and then drawing a ball from bag (A). 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Assume that you very much dislike drawing a ball from bag (A). In this case you might choose 
the sure amount of money of 50 cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the 
treatment) already in the first row. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
The point where you switch from the left hand side to the right hand side lies normally 
somewhere between the first and the last row. As soon as you have once checked the box at the 
right hand side, you should very carefully check whether it makes sense for you to switch back 
to the left hand side in any following row. Consider the following situation. If you preferred 50 
cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) in the first row to 
drawing from bag (A), then most likely you might prefer even more so 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 
80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the treatment) in the second row over drawing from bag (A), 
because 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the treatment) is more money 
than 50 cents  (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) which, in 
this example, you preferred over drawing from bag (A) before. 
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Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Now we explain the second part to you. The second part of our game is similar to the first part. 
The only difference is that bag (A) is replaced by bag (B). Now you have to choose between 
drawing a ball from bag (B) thereby maybe winning 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, 
according to the treatment) or taking a sure amount of money home. 
Drawing a ball from bag (B) works as follows: This bag contains twenty balls. The balls are 
either white ore orange as before, but this time we don’t tell you the exact number of white and 
orange balls. However, in sum there are 20 balls in this bag (B). When you decide to draw a ball 
from bag (B), you draw a ball blindly. Before you draw the ball you choose a color (let’s say 
white). If the drawn ball is really white, you receive 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, 
according to the treatment). If the drawn ball is orange, you get nothing. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
You will receive a decision sheet which looks exactly like the slide on the overhead projector 
(Switch on overhead projector and point to the slide). We also ask you for this sheet to make a 
decision for each row. Now you have to decide between drawing a ball from bag (B) (point to 
the left) and a sure amount of money (point to the right). This looks for example like this: In the 
first row you decide whether you prefer drawing a ball from bag (B) and thereby maybe winning 
10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment), or if you prefer taking 50 cents 
(respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) home for sure. Assuming 
that you prefer drawing a ball from bag (B) instead of getting 50 cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 
cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) for sure, which box do you have to check in this 
case? (Assume answer is “left”.) Right, you check the box at the left side. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
In the second row you decide again between drawing a ball from bag (B) and a sure amount of 
money. Now you are offered 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the 
treatment) to take home for sure. As you can see, the sure amount on the right hand side 
increases successively. As long as you prefer drawing a ball from bag (B) to taking a sure 
amount of money home, you check the box at the left hand side. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Assume that you like drawing a ball from bag (B) very much, then you might check the boxes on 
the left hand side until the last but one row. In the very last row you then have to choose between 
getting 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment) for sure if you check the 
box on the right side or maybe winning 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the 
treatment) by checking the box on the left side and then drawing a ball from bag (B). 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Assume that you very much dislike drawing a ball from bag (B). In this case you will choose the 
sure amount of money of 50 cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the 
treatment) already in the first row. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
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The point where you switch from the left hand side to the right hand side lies normally 
somewhere between the first and the last row. As soon as you have once checked the box at the 
right hand side, you should very carefully check whether it makes sense for you to switch back 
to the left hand side in any following row. Consider the following situation. If you preferred 50 
cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) in the first row to 
drawing from bag (B), then most likely you might prefer even more so 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 
80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the treatment) in the second row over drawing from bag (B), 
because 1 € (respectively 60 cents, 80 cents, 1.20 €, according to the treatment) is more money 
than 50 cents (respectively 30 cents, 40 cents, 60 cents, according to the treatment) which you 
preferred, in this example, over drawing from bag (B) before. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
We still have to explain how you get your money. After all of you have made your 40 decisions 
(20 decisions on your first sheet, 20 decisions on your second sheet) everybody will draw a card 
from these 40 cards. The cards are numbered from 1 to 40. (Ask a student to draw a card. 
Assume 5 is drawn.) When you have drawn the number 5, your decision with number 5 on your 
decision sheets is played for real. This is the most important thing: If you have chosen to draw a 
ball from bag (A) in the selected decision, you may then draw a ball from bag (A). You win 10 € 
(respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment), if you announce the drawn color, 
otherwise you get nothing. If you have chosen the sure amount of money, you get 2.50 € 
(respectively 1.5 €, 2 € or 3 €, according to the treatment) in this example, 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Let’s make another example: If you have drawn the number 38, what will happen when you have 
checked the box on the left hand side? (Assume the answer is correct.) Right, you may draw a 
ball from bag (B). You win 10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment) if the 
color is correct and nothing otherwise. What will happen when you have checked the box on the 
right hand side? (Assume the answer is correct.) Right, you take 9 € (respectively 5.4 €, 7.2 € or 
10.8 €, according to the treatment) home. Whether you draw a ball from bag (B) and maybe win 
10 € (respectively 6 €, 8 € or 12 €, according to the treatment) or take the sure amount of money 
home depends on whether you have checked the box at the left or at the right hand side. 
As each of your 40 decisions could be drawn, you should consider carefully in each row if you 
want to draw a ball from bag (A) or (B) or if you want to take a sure amount of money home. 
 
Everybody ok ? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
If no questions have been unanswered, then you can start making your choices. Once you are 
finished, please turn over your decision sheet and wait until all others have finished this part. 
 
Let subjects make their decisions and collect decision sheets that have been turned over. 
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Decision sheet 
 
Risk and ambiguity 
[1] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 0.50 euro for sure  
[2] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 1 euro for sure  
[3] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 1.50 euro for sure  
[4] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 2 euro for sure  
[5] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 2.50 euro for sure  
[6] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 3 euro for sure  
[7] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 3.50 euro for sure  
[8] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 4 euro for sure  
[9] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 4.50 euro for sure  
[10] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 5 euro for sure  
[11] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 5.50 euro for sure  
[12] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 6 euro for sure  
[13] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 6.50 euro for sure  
[14] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 7 euro for sure  
[15] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 7.50 euro for sure  
[16] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 8 euro for sure  
[17] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 8.50 euro for sure  
[18] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 9 euro for sure  
[19] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 9.50 euro for sure  
[20] draw from bag A     Ο or Ο 10 euro for sure 
 
[analogously for bag B or stake sizes 6 €, 8 €, 12 €] 
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A photograph illustrating how participants drew from one of the bags (A or B) 
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Time preferences experiment (this experiment was run several months after the 
experiment on risk and ambiguity attitudes) 
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game. From now on, 
please don’t talk to your neighbor and listen carefully. We will frequently stop during our 
explanation and allow you to ask questions. Therefore, please raise your hand and one of us will 
come to you to answer your question.  
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
You can earn money in this game. You will have to decide whether you want to get a certain 
amount of money at an earlier date or another, possibly larger, amount at a later date. For 
example, you might be asked to choose between a smaller amount of money today and a bigger 
amount of money in three weeks. If you decide for “today”, you will get your money in cash at 
the end of this lesson. If you decide for “in three weeks”, you will receive your money in a 
closed envelope in three weeks. The envelope will be marked with your student number. 
It might also be the case that the earlier amount will be paid in three weeks only, and the later 
amount in six weeks from now, or even in more than one year from now. We will explain all 
possibilities in detail in the following. As you know, we will come back to run some experiments 
with you in the course of two years, hence you can be sure to get your money even if you choose 
a date that is in one-year time only. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
You will receive eight different decision sheets. You have to choose 160 times between an 
earlier amount and a later but maybe higher amount of money. Only one of your decisions will 
be relevant. We will explain that carefully at the end of this instruction. We brought along here 
an example decision sheet. Note that this example will not be used in the experiment. The 
amounts of money indicated on this example sheet only serve illustration purposes. Let us have a 
look at the example together. (Put slide on the overhead projector.) When we play the game we 
will ask you to make a decision for each row. This looks, e.g., like this: In the first row you 
decide whether you prefer taking home 6.10 € today (point to the left) or receiving 6.10 € in 
three weeks from now (point to the right). Assuming that you prefer taking home 6.10 € today, 
where do you have to check the box? (Assume answer is “left”.) Right, you check the box at the 
left hand side. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Assuming that you prefer receiving 6.10 € in three weeks from now, where do you have to check 
the box? (Assume answer is “right”.) Right, then you check the box at the right hand side. In the 
second row you decide again between taking home 6.10 € today and now a larger amount of 
6.30 €, which you could receive in three weeks from now. You can see that the amount on the 
right hand side increases successively row by row. As long as you prefer taking home 6.10 € 
today, you check the box at the left hand side. As soon as you prefer receiving the higher amount 
in three weeks from now, you check the box at the right hand side. (show example) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
As soon as you have once checked the box at the right hand side, you should consider carefully 
whether it makes sense for you to switch back to the left-hand side at any successive row. 
Consider the situation where you prefer receiving 6.50 € in three weeks to taking home 6.10 € 
today. Then it seems most likely that you will prefer receiving 6.70 € in three weeks even more 
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to taking home 6.10 € today, because 6.70 € is more money than 6.50 € which you preferred over 
the 6.10 € before. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Let’s consider another example with respect to the timing of payoffs. Here is another example 
decision sheet. (Put slide with three weeks upfront-delay on the overhead projector.) Here you 
have to decide whether you prefer receiving 6.10 € in three weeks from now or if you prefer 
receiving a somewhat larger amount in six weeks from now. The rules to fill out the decision 
sheet stay the same. Depending on whether you prefer receiving the money in three or in six 
weeks from now, you check the box at the left or the right hand side. As soon as you have once 
checked the box at the right hand side, you should consider carefully whether it makes sense to 
you to switch back to the left-hand side in any successive row for the same reasons as in the 
previous example. Shall I repeat this example? (If anybody says Yes, then repeat it, now in the 
frame of three and six weeks delay for early and late payoffs.) 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
You see on this example sheet that the early and late payoffs are paid in three weeks, 
respectively six weeks, from now on. Now I show you another example. (Put another slide with 
a one-year delay for the late payoff on the projector.) Note that the amounts of money on this 
example are identical to the previous slide. The only change concerns the timing of the payment 
concerning the later payoff. In the previous example this was six weeks from now. In the current 
example it is one year and three weeks from now. You will also face such a timing on your 
decision sheets once we start the experiment. You will also find a situation where the early 
amount can be paid out today, and the late amount in exactly one year. Please note that all dates 
have been chosen such that on the possible dates you will have a regular school day. We have 
already checked back with the principal of your school that we will come back exactly on these 
future dates (in three weeks, six weeks, one year, or one year and three weeks), in case this is 
necessary to pay out the money to you. In the unlikely case that any of you will change schools, 
then we have asked an administrator of your school to send the money to your new address. Note 
that in this case we will give the administrator your anonymous code that he – and only he – can 
use to figure out your identity to send the money to you. 
 
Now we explain to you how you get the money from this experiment. You will receive eight 
different decision sheets with twenty decisions each. This makes 160 decisions all together. Each 
of you may draw a card from these 160 cards at the end of the session. The cards are numbered 
from 1 to 160. Assume you have drawn the number 5. Therefore the decision with number 5 on 
your decision sheets is played for real. This is the most important thing: If you have checked the 
box on the left hand side in the selected decision, you receive in our example that I put on the 
overhead projector now 6.10 € today. If you have checked the box on the right hand side, you 
receive 6.90 € in three weeks from now. 
 
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
Let’s look at another example. Assume you have drawn the number 22. Now the decision with 
number 22 on your decision sheets is played for real. Let’s consider this example sheet with the 
one-year delay. What will happen if you have checked the box on the left hand side? (Assume the 
answer is correct.) Right, you receive 6.10 € in three weeks from now. What will happen if you 
have checked the box on the right hand side? (Assume the answer is correct.) Right, then you 
will receive 6.30 in one year and three weeks from now. 
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As each of your 160 decisions is equally likely to be drawn, you should consider your decision 
very carefully in each single row, since this row could be drawn for payment. 
 
Everybody ok? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. 
 
If no questions have been unanswered, then you can start making your choices. Once you are 
finished, please turn over your decision sheet and wait until all others have finished this part. 
 
Let subjects make their decisions and collect decision sheets that have been turned over. 
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Time preferences – Decision sheet (the order of decision sheets was random) 
 amount today or  amount in 3 weeks 
[1] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 10.10 euro in 3 weeks  
[2] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 10.30 euro in 3 weeks 
[3] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 10.50 euro in 3 weeks 
[4] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 10.70 euro in 3 weeks 
[5] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 10.90 euro in 3 weeks 
[6] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 11.10 euro in 3 weeks 
[7] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 11.30 euro in 3 weeks 
[8] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 11.50 euro in 3 weeks 
[9] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 11.70 euro in 3 weeks 
[10] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 11.90 euro in 3 weeks 
[11] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 12.10 euro in 3 weeks 
[12] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 12.30 euro in 3 weeks 
[13] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 12.50 euro in 3 weeks 
[14] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 12.70 euro in 3 weeks 
[15] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 12.90 euro in 3 weeks 
[16] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 13.10 euro in 3 weeks 
[17] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 13.30 euro in 3 weeks 
[18] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 13.50 euro in 3 weeks 
[19] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 13.70 euro in 3 weeks 
[20] 10.10 euro today     Ο or   Ο 13.90 euro in 3 weeks 
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Time preferences – Decision sheet (the order of decision sheets was random) 
 amount today or  amount in 3 weeks 
[21] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.05 euro in 3 weeks  
[22] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.15 euro in 3 weeks 
[23] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.25 euro in 3 weeks 
[24] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.35 euro in 3 weeks 
[25] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.45 euro in 3 weeks 
[26] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.55 euro in 3 weeks 
[27] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.65 euro in 3 weeks 
[28] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.75 euro in 3 weeks 
[29] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.85 euro in 3 weeks 
[30] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 4.95 euro in 3 weeks 
[31] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.05 euro in 3 weeks 
[32] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.15 euro in 3 weeks 
[33] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.25 euro in 3 weeks 
[34] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.35 euro in 3 weeks 
[35] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.45 euro in 3 weeks 
[36] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.55 euro in 3 weeks 
[37] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.65 euro in 3 weeks 
[38] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.75 euro in 3 weeks 
[39] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.85 euro in 3 weeks 
[40] 4.05 euro today     Ο or   Ο 5.95 euro in 3 weeks 
 
[Six further sheets varied the timing of these payoffs by once adding an upfront-delay of 
three weeks for the earlier payoff and once by using a delay between earlier and later 
payoff of one year instead of three weeks. See Figure 5 for an illustration. Note that the 
eight decision sheets were handed out in random order] 
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A2. Questionnaire [translated from German] 
 
1) I am O female O male 
 
2) I was born in the following year: ________________. 
 
3) I am born in the following month: _______________. 
 
4) I have _____ (how many?) siblings. 
 
5) I was born as _________ (which number?) child in my family. 
 
6) Per week I have roughly _________ euro pocket money. 
I spend my pocket money on: 
O mobile phone bill O computer games O clothes 
O magazines O cinema O going out 
O food and beverages O sport O cosmetica 
O music O sweets O concerts 
O cigarettes O alcohol O expenses from school 
O toys O other: _________________________________________ 
(For our analysis we create the variables “smoking” and “alcohol consumption” and code it 
as 1 if a subject spends pocket money on cigarettes respectively alcohol and 0 otherwise.) 
 
7) I live in the following village: __________________________ 
 
8) How often do you attend religious celebrations per month? (for example mass, celebration 
at a mosque, …) 
 0 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x > (more than) 4 x 
 O  O  O  O  O  O 
 
9) Please mark the appropriate item with a cross: 
O My parents and I were born in Austria. 
O I was born in Austria. My mother and my father were not born in Austria. 
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O I was born in Austria. One of my parents was not born in Austria. 
O I was not born in Austria, nor were my parents. 
 
10) Do you save money? 
O yes O no 
(For our analysis we create the variable “saving” and code it as 1 if a subject checks “yes” 
and 0 otherwise.) 
 
11) I am _____ m tall. 
 
12) I weigh _____ kg. 
(For our analysis we create the variable “bodymass” = weight/height^2.) 
 
 
 
